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The announcement by the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi in his 
Independence Day address to the nation of Government’s intent to 
appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) marked the gamechanger event 
that the country was to embark up on.1 The subsequent appointment, 
in December 2019,2 of General Bipin Rawat, to the newly created 
appointment as its first incumbent and the simultaneous creation 
of a Department of Military Affairs as a separate vertical within the 
Ministry of Defence with the CDS as its ex-officio Secretary are each 
and together tectonic shifts t at have moved the balance in Civil-
Military relations to a new normal. It has also disruptively altered the 
entire edifice of the structure of decision making relating to matters 
of military. 
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The “why” and “why now” for these decisions is best understood 
from the following excerpts from the Hon’ble Prime Minister’s address: 
“… The world is changing today, the scope of war is changing, the nature 
of war is changing. It is becoming technology driven; in the circumstances 
India too should not have a fragmented approach …
… Our entire military power will have to work in unison and move 
forward … things cannot move smoothly if anyone from the Navy, Army 
and Air Force is a step ahead from the other two forces, while the other two 
are lagging behind. All the three should move simultaneously at the same 
pace … 
… today we have decided that we will now have a Chief of Defence Staff—
CDS and after formation of this post all the three forces will get effective 
leadership at the top level.”3
Three aspects stand out in this very deliberately drafted excerpt of 
the address. First, an acknowledgement that the (then) approach was 
“fragmented.” Second, the need for the three Services to “march in step” 
with good coordination. Third, and importantly, there was an expectation 
that “the three forces will get an effective leadership at the top level.”
Later, when the decision to create a Department of Military Affairs 
(DMA) was announced, in a rat er direct and unexpected manner, with 
its notification and list of allocated subjects, it took a while to absorb the 
sheer gravity and implications of this decision. 
The need for a CDS for India’s Armed Forces had been felt for several 
decades and even recommended by various Reform Committees in the 
past, in more recent times by the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) under 
the Chairmanship of the venerable K. Subrahmanyam. The committee 
was set up by the Government of India on July 29, 1999 three days after 
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the conclusion of the Kargil War “to examine the sequence of events and 
make recommendations for the future.” This was followed by subsequent 
recommendations by the Group of Ministers in May 2001.4 
The focus here is not so much on the thought underlying the decision 
or the processes leading to the appointment of the CDS and the DMA, as 
the need to understand the implications for the future, especially how the 
Armed Forces will take their long denied space in the decision-making 
edifice of the Government of India. 
Creation of the Department of Military Affairs
The creation of the DMA was encrusted through Government of India 
(Allocation of Business) Three Hundred and Fifty-third Amendment 
Rules, 20195 by which the Allocation of Business Rules, 1961 were 
amended as follows: 
  Inclusion as a separate Department in the First Schedule of the 
Rules under “Ministry of Defence (Raksha Mantralaya).” These 
Departments now are:
m Department of Defence (Raksha Vibhag)
m Department of Military Affairs (Sainya Karya Vibhag) 
m Department of Defence Production (Raksha Utpadan Vibhag)
m Department of Defence Research and Development (Raksha 
Anusandhan aur Vikas Vibhag)
m Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (Po rva Senani Kalyan 
Vibhag)
  As notified vide Cabinet Secretariat Notification of 30th December 
2019, the subjects allocated to the Department of Military Affairs 
(Sainya Karya Vibhag) are: 
m The Armed Forces of the Union, namely, Army, Navy and Air Force.
m Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence comprising 
of Army Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, Air Headquarters 
and Integrated Defence Staff Headquarters.
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m The Territorial Army.
m Works relating to Army, Navy and Air Force.
m Procurement exclusive to the Services except capital acquisitions, 
as per prevalent rules and procedures.
m Promoting jointness in procurement, training and staffing for 
the Services through joint planning and integration of their 
requirements.
m Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal 
utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, 
including through establishment of joint/theatre commands.
m Promoting use of indigenous equipment by the Services.
The critical decision of course is the appointment of the CDS. In 
addition to his functions as Military Advisor to the Raksha Mantri and as 
Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, is to also be the 
ex-officio Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs. The point of 
utmost significance is that it is now a Military officer in uniform who is 
the Secretary of the Government Department whose work areas include 
the direct oversight of the administration and management of the Armed 
Forces of the Nation. 
Major Areas of Work Transferred to the DMA
It is the specific subject heads as listed in the respective charters of each of 
the transferred sections that define the immensity of the transfer. These 
subjects include:
  Military Operations including CI Ops. Deployment of Forces, Border 
Intelligence, Air Defence.
  Neighbourhood countries.
  Organisation and Manpower Planning, Pay and Allowances, Defence 
Services Regulations. 
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  Personnel Management—Postings, Promotions, Cadre Management 
and Reviews, Complaints, Discipline, etc. 
  Terms and Conditions of Service, Grant of PC, SSC, etc., Recruitment, 
Policy, Exams through UPSC for CDS/NDA & Naval Academy 
Examination/IMA. 
  Training Matters—CAT “A” Estts., Field Firing Ranges. 
  Defence Diplomacy.
  Budget Aspects, Appropriation/Accounts and Annual Training 
Grant, War and Peace system of Accounting.
  Planning and procurement of wherewithal through Revenue route. 
  Development of communication/roads.
  Policy, provisioning and procurement of clothing (including special 
clothing) and special equipment.
  Maintenance of Platforms—Aircraft, Ships.
  War Wastage Reserves.
Transfer of Work and Personnel to Department of Military 
Affairs (DMA)6
A total of Twenty-two Sections of the Department of Defence stood 
transferred to the newly created DMA. These were the Sections already 
executing the Subjects at Sers 1 to 5 of the above list of transferred subjects. 
Along with the Sections and their respective complement of authorised 
staff, two posts of Joint Secretary, thirteen in the ranks of Director/
Deputy Secretary and twenty-five in the grade of Under Secretary also 
stand transferred. 
Subjects Retained to be Dealt by the Department of 
Defence (DoD)
To give contextuality, it is pertinent to also see the subjects that remain 
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allocated to the Department of Defence. These are, principally, the 
following:
  Defence of India and every part thereof including defence policy, 
preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in 
times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective 
demobilisation.
  The Reserves of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
  The National Cadet Corps.
  Remount, Veterinary and Farms Organisation.
  Canteen Stores Department (India).
  Civilian Services paid from Defence Estimates.
  Hydrographic surveys and preparation of navigational charts.
  Defence Accounts Department.
  Cantonment and Cantonment Boards, Defence lands and Property. 
  Purchase of food stuffs for military requirements and their disposal 
excluding those entrusted to Department of Food and Public 
Distribution.
  All matters relating to Coast Guard Organisation.
  Matters relating to diving and related activities in the country.
  “Procurement exclusive to the Defence services” substituted by 
“Capital Acquisitions” exclusive to the Defence Services.
  All matters relating to BRDB and BRO. 
  Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, National Defence College 
and any other organisation within the Ministry of Defence whose 
remit is broader than military matters.
The highlighted portions, which are both modifications to existing 
subjects indicate that all policy would be in the realm of the DoD with 
its role pitched at the level of “defence” of which, by implication, the 
“military” is a subset.
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Organisation of the DMA
The DMA is now one of the five verticals of the Ministry of Defence, headed 
by the Chief of Defence Staff, who acts as its ex-officio Secretary and reports 
directly to the Raksha Mantri on subjects allocated to his Department. In 
addition to the Chief of Defence Staff, the Department staff comprises of 
two Joint Secretaries, thirteen Deputy Secretaries, and twenty-five Under-
Secretaries and Twenty-two Section Officers whose sections had earlier 
formed part of the Department of Defence and now stand transferred to the 
DMA vide Department of Defence ORDER dated January 9, 2020.
Is the DMA Adequately Empowered to Execute its 
Charter?
A persistent apprehension in the strategic community is whether the 
DMA has been adequately empowered to effectively fulfil its charter. A 
close analysis of the charter of the DMA vis-à-vis the powers accorded to 
it would largely dispel such doubts.
  Control of the Armed Forces of the Union—Army, Navy 
and Air Force and HQ IDS, Army, Navy and Air HQ and 
Territorial Army: All major aspects of Armed Forces functioning 
have been brought under the ambit of the DMA. These include the 
organisation, recruitment, training, terms and conditions of service, 
personnel management including career management of all ranks. 
The advantage of the flurry of proposals that would need to be taken 
to reorganise the Forces to oll out integration, etc., now being 
processed for Government approval through a Department headed 
by the CDS are obvious. 
  Works relating to Army, Navy and Air Force: Works planning, 
sanctions and oversight over execution have been brought under the 
DMA. This would enable hands-on oversight and close monitoring 
of several projects. 
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  Procurement exclusive to the Services except Capital Acquisitions: 
All revenue procurement for the Armed Forces would now be carried 
out with the oversight of the DMA. The participation of the CDS 
and the Service Chiefs in the Capital procurement process remains 
unaltered. Even for Capital procurement, the CDS has been chartered 
to assign inter-services prioritisation. 
  Promoting jointness in procurement, training and staffing of 
the Services through joint planning and integration of their 
requirements: The powers bestowed on the DMA are adequate 
for it to assume the role of an integrator of planning, coordination, 
procurement, resource management and training. Even though the 
CDS may not have operational control over the three Forces, his 
role as “Single Point Advisor” would necessarily have bearing on the 
political approval and guidance to the conduct of operations. More 
on this later in the Chapter.
  Promoting use of indigenous equipment by the Services: With 
control over revenue procurements, the DMA could, through 
gentle guidance move the procurement regimen towards one where 
non-critical procurements are increasingly sourced indigenously. 
This would require to be done at a “measured pace” item-wise, 
so as not to cause shortfalls. The CDS would also collaborate and 
coordinate with the three Services Chiefs at forums like the DAC 
to make a push for indigenisation of platforms, large equipment 
and critical spares. 
  Facilitation of restructuring of military commands for optimal 
utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, 
including through establishment of joint/theatre commands: As 
emphasised by the Hon’ble Prime Minister in his Independence Day 
address, this is the very raison d’être for the decision to appoint a CDS. 
The CDS has been empowered with requisite control over entities, 
organisations and structures that would need to be amalgamated/
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reorganised. It is now his alacrity, astuteness and professional wisdom 
to visualise what the restructured theatres would be and to draw up the 
roadmap to seamlessly transition without compromising operational 
efficacy. This has been elaborated in detail later in the Chapter. 
Induction of Armed Forces Officers in the DMA
The subjects allocated to the DMA can be grouped into those that have 
been transferred from the DoD to the DMA and the three “greenfield” 
subjects (Sers 6-8 of list of subjects allocated to DMA) that have not been 
in the undivided list of subjects of the DoD. 
Work pertaining to the transferred subjects are already being executed 
in the Sections along with their hierarchies that have been transferred to 
the DMA. 
It is in regard to the “greenfield” subjects, the very nature of which 
requires experienced military hands with high professional knowledge and 
understanding that would per force make it imperative for induction of Armed 
Force officers and personnel into the DMA. Work on these subjects have to 
be visualised, planned and structures created for execution. By their very 
nature, these subjects require specialised military knowledge and experience. 
Accretions to DMA staffing would be required to execute its functions in 
these “greenfield” areas. These three “new” subjects of work allocated to 
the DMA would require induction of Armed Forces Officers into the DMA. 
Alongside, the prospect of including Armed Forces Officers in the 
Central Staffing Scheme also merits c nsideration. 
Devolution of Authority and Powers to Services HQ
The GoM Report itself had strongly suggested “decentralisation of 
decision-making” and “delegation of powers to Services HQ wherever 
feasible,” to commence with on routine administrative issues relating to 
personnel management of respective Forces up to a particular rank. This 
would considerably ease pressure on the CDS and allow the DMA space 
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and time to focus on forward planning. Such a move would again de facto 
nullify the “Attached Offices” status of the Services HQ. 
Restructuring Service HQ in Tandem with DMA
The “mismatch” between various “levels” of functionaries at the Services 
HQ and the Ministry of Defence lies at the root of issues relating to 
equivalence, etc., that have caused so much angst in the recent past. There 
is occasion now to review the structures of the Services HQ to bring them 
“at par” with those in the DMA—level for level. This would ease the 
eventual process of the Services HQ themselves becoming Departments 
of the Ministry of Defence. 
Time to Develop a Robust Bench Strength of Competent 
“Defence Administrators”
Nether Civil or Military Officers can expect or hope to serve in the DMA 
or the Services HQ beyond stipulated tenures. It is only the AFHQ Civil 
Service, entirely dedicated to the Ministry of Defence that can effectively 
serve this purpose. Amongst the early initiatives should be to review the 
deployment of this Service, train and utilise it to provide the backbone 
of support to decision-making across the DMA and the Services HQ. A 
long-standing suggestion to open the cadre to retiring Services Officers 
to facilitate ploughing back the wealth of their experience for the benefit 
of the organisation, should be reconsidered. 
Shift in Work Culture
Above all, it is imperative for a culture of “Responsibility-Authority-
Accountability,” as already being practised for operational matters, to be 
inculcated even for administrative decisions. This is an absolute “must” for 
effective and speedy decision-making and ensuring a change in prevalent 
work culture. 
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Jointness and Integration in the Armed Forces
To ensure true jointness in the armed forces we need to move from 
symbolism to substance. The philosophy should be—“Three Services, One 
Joint Force,” which should lead to optimum operational effectiveness. 
Most important, it cannot be a please all effort. Some may gain or lose, 
so be it. We have been held hostage to such thinking/balancing for too 
long—not anymore !
The first step towards achieving jointness is for the COSC headed by 
the CDS to define the threats that the country is likely to face, in the near 
term, i.e., 5-7 years, as also over the horizon threats in the long term, 
i.e., 15-20 years. This threat perception should then prompt an updation 
of the joint services doctrine, followed by individual service doctrines. 
Capability development and prioritisation will axiomatically follow.
There is great scope to bring about jointness in operations, training, 
communications and logistics to include supply, transport, as also repair 
and maintenance within the three services. Whilst operations and training 
will get greatly enhanced through the creation of “Integrated Theatres,” 
the other aspects also lend themselves to greater optimisation and savings 
through jointness. Some of the measures that should be adopted are 
detailed below: 
  Establishment of common logistics nodes where the three services can 
draw on rations, fuel and other miscellaneous logistics requirements.
  Commonality of ransport, less specialist vehicles.
  Optimisation of the repair and recovery organisations and facilities 
available with EME and their counterparts with the IAF and IN. 
There is a lot of duplication within the three services, based on 
common equipment like B vehicles, small arms, AD weapons systems, 
UAVs, helicopters, etc.
  Annual maintenance contracts of commonly held equipment like 
Herons, Brahmos, etc., can also be optimised. The vast resources and 
expertise of DGEME can be put to optimum use. 
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  It may be worthwhile to order a study under the aegis of CISC/
VCDS to recommend logistics optimisation within the three 
services. Similarly, the SO-in-C may be tasked to work out common 
signal communication protocols, as also standardisation, to the 
extent feasible, of communication equipment, medium and secrecy 
protocols, to ensure seamless inter-services communication. A small 
set-up like “TRAI” may be created under the CDS to coordinate and 
oversee this critical aspect.
Inter-Services Prioritisation for  
Capital Acquisition Proposals
In times of inadequate defence budget, especially for capital acquisitions, 
this role of the CDS has become critical, so that the meagre budget is 
put to optimum usage. The existing procedure mainly revolves around 
the LTPP/LTIPP (Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan) prepared by 
HQ IDS, based on which inter-services allocations are made by the MOD 
(which will continue to do so, being the charter of the Defence Secretary).
Intra Service priorities are laid down by respective Services, though 
this doesn’t get reflected in the actual procurement. Based on the tedious 
procurement process, it is possible that quite often, a lower priority item 
gets through, whilst a higher priority equipment faces hurdles. This 
anomaly needs to be set right, through the creation of a long-term budget 
purchase plan, so that the meagre resources are spent on priority items. 
It is learnt that the Government is already working on a five-year budget 
for defence capital acquisitions, which will greatly facilitate procurement 
of priority items.
The CDS, of course, as per mandate will have a major say in inter-
services prioritisation of the defence budget for capital acquisition. It is a 
challenging mandate, the more so because of already existing committed 
liabilities. The best way is for the CDS to scrutinise all big-ticket items and 
see how they fit into the joint war fighting doctrine/plans; also, examine 
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the affect it will have on prolonged committed liabilities, especially for the 
other two services. A good example is the recent decision to drop plans 
to acquire a third aircraft carrier, which would have severely curtailed the 
availability of funds for modernisation of the other two services.
Similarly, the requirement of IAF to build to a strength of 44 
Squadrons needs deeper analysis, in light of acquisition of sophisticated 
aircraft and air defence systems. Unmanned aerial platforms are likely to 
revolutionise future warfare, that too at a fraction of the cost of 4th/5th 
Generation aircraft. A deeper analysis is necessary to get the right mix. The 
Indian Army has already dropped its ambitious plans for the “Battlefield 
Management System” and deferred some big-ticket purchases, like the 
FICV and FRCV. 
The Robotics revolution is well under way and we haven’t even started 
with a clarity of what that means, both in terms of doctrinal changes as 
well as development of related technology. We are aware that DRDO is 
doing some good work, but that’s not enough. The book Wired for War 
by P. W. Singer (New York Times Bestseller, Penguin Books, 2010) is a 
compelling and authoritative account of how robots will become integral 
to twenty-first century conflict in all the four dimensions, land, sea, air 
and space. In the words of the author, science fiction has turned into 
science reality. The killing of Iranian General Suleimani in a US drone 
strike recently has illustrated this starkly. Our recommendation is that 
this subject be taken under direct aegis of the CDS and a comprehensive 
task force assigned to take it forwa d. This must be accorded the highest 
priority both doctrinally and for capability development, involving both 
DRDO and the best of private sector.
Desired End State
In our view the best way forward is to adopt regressive planning, i.e., 
first decide the end state and then work backwards how to achieve it, in 
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phases, as may be necessary. To achieve true jointness we need an end 
state based on “Integrated Theatres” under 4-star Generals/equivalent 
with tri-service/bi-service assets under one Commander. At the apex 
level, should be a 5-star CDS with integrated staff to support him. The 
integrated theatres should report to the CDS and through him to the 
Raksha Mantri and the CCS. The three Service Chiefs should head their 
services and be responsible for manning, equipping, individual training 
and other miscellaneous aspects. This should be the long-term desired 
end state. However, for now, this article will confine itself to what has 
been sanctioned by the Government, i.e., A 4-Star CDS (First amongst 
equals), with no operational role and military command, which will 
continue to rest with respective Service Chiefs.
Integrated Theatres 
An Integrated Theatre of Military Operations envisages a unified 
command of the three/two services within the defined theatre, under a 
single Commander who may be from the service(s) which has the most 
prominent role within that theatre. The Theatre will normally be defined 
by a geographical space and include the land, sea and airspace as applicable, 
which is likely to get involved in military operations. The Integrated 
Theatres may also be defined functionally, based on the commonality of 
role/purpose, i.e., an aerospace/air defence theatre.
So far, the Indian Armed Forces have been functioning as single service 
commands, which support each other d ring operations. This at best is an 
arrangement that may be functional, but certainly not optimal for meeting the 
requirements of fast-paced synergised operations in the Twenty-first Century.
Based on the threat on either flank or the maritime domain, certain 
geographical theatres stand out, along with some key functional 
theatres. A few options exist, each having their own merit. A reasonably 
viable option is detailed in succeeding paragraphs. Certain specific 
service commands, for the present, will continue to remain directly 
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under the Service HQ. Presently, the following Integrated Theatres 
are recommended: 
  Northern Theatre 
m Including jurisdiction of current Northern Command, including 
14, 15, 16 corps and 9 corps (extended up to Ravi River).
m Will also be responsible for the China front in Ladakh, HP and 
Uttarakhand, with an Inf/Mountain Division, suitably located 
for reaction in HP and Uttarakhand.
m The IAF will have to designate an Air Command (between WAC 
and SWAC) to be part of this theatre and provide air support and 
conduct air operations in support.
m The Northern Army Commander may be upgraded as the 
Northern Theatre Commander with HQ at Udhampur.
  Western Theatre
m Will include the Army’s Western Command (less 9 Corps), 
SW Command and Southern Command, organised into two 
Commands—Western and Southern, with the SW Army 
Commander being designated the Western Theatre Commander, 
with HQ at Jaipur. 
m One of the Air Commands (between WAC and SWAC) will look 
after the Western Theatre with suitable adjustment of boundaries, 
location and rationalisation of assets.
  Eastern Theatre
m Responsible for the Eastern China border, Nepal, Bhutan, 
Myanmar and Bangladesh borders.
m Comprised of Eastern Command, now redesignated as the Eastern 
Theatre with HQ at Kolkata and the Eastern Air Command, 
which may be suitably relocated, if considered necessary.
  Maritime Theatre
m Comprising the Navy assets of Western and Eastern Naval 
Commands, with the WNC redesignated as the Maritime Theatre.
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m Southern Air Command, suitably augmented with assets, will be 
placed under Command to provide the air support.
m 91 Inf Bde, should also be placed under Command to provide 
the Army component of the amphibious capability.
  Aerospace and Air Defence Theatre
m This will cater for the overall air defence responsibility of the 
country, with bulk of army and air force AD assets under it.
m The Central Air Command would be upgraded to a theatre, 
also retaining a portion of air assets as central reserve to provide 
flexibility. This theatre should also be responsible for all space 
assets of the country, providing space support to other theatres.
  The Central Command of the Army will remain directly under Army 
HQ and be responsible for the hinterland and lines of communication, 
with ATNK&K, MG&G and MB areas under it.
  The individual services will also retain direct control of their training 
and maintenance commands (Southern Command in case of Navy).
  Similarly, the Strategic Forces Command and Andaman Nicobar 
Command will continue as hitherto fore, under HQ IDS/CDS.
  For out of area contingencies, both Aerospace and Maritime theatres 
should be mandated, with asset allocation for the task decided by the 
CDS from other theatres also, as necessary.
As far as command and control is concerned, the Theatre Commanders 
would report to the Service HQ t  which the Theatre Commander 
belongs.
The CDS will of course have a major coordination role and approve 
shifting of assets as may be necessitated by an operational contingency. 
The role of the COSC may have to become more prominent, with the 
military directive to the Theatre Commanders being issued by the COSC, 
rather than individual Service HQ.
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The status of Theatre Commanders will have to be enhanced; could 
be done either through conferring 4-star rank or even if 3-star, a select 
rank superior to the status of an Army Commander. This can be decided 
in consultation with the Government.
Why Are the CDS and DMA a Gamechanger?
For a single significant reason—that the Government has placed intrinsic 
faith and trust in the capability of the Armed Forces to administer themselves 
and manage the “military space” in the canvas of Government functioning.
It is however the combination of the three roles the CDS would play 
that makes his appointment and creation of the DMA a gamechanger. 
As the Permanent chairman COSC, the CDS can set the agenda and 
pace for collaborative decision-making on jointness of plans and 
integration of resources through creation of “Integrated Theatres,” 
as mandated. In addition, based on the likely threat perception (both 
short and long-term) an updated joint warfare doctrine should be 
formulated on priority.
Further, optimisation of resources for training, logistics, 
communication, personnel management and inter-services prioritisation 
of capability acquisition will get us the desired interoperability and the 
best out of the limited defence budget.
As secretary DMA and Principal Military Advisor to the Raksha Mantri, 
the CDS would have the final secretarial word on the administrative 
processing of these proposals and approval of implementation plans and 
orders. At each stage, the CDS is the veritable “Shepherd” who will guide 
and monitor the course and pace of military reform.
It is now up to the Armed Forces to “seize the opportunity” and 
make the institution of the CDS and DMA a success—not just for the 
good of the Forces, but also as much for the Nation.
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